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An endless debate rages over the effectiveness and
efficiency of the Department of Defense. Despite several
important studies, such as the Packard Commission's and
numerous internal improvements made by the Department of
Defense, critics complain that more needs to be done and
that it is impossible to create the inertia needed to move
such a massive organization. There are even those who claim
that, if significant change are to be made, the very
structure of the organization must be altered.
Without reciting the long and pessimistic list of "what
is wrong with the Department of Defense" touted by legions
of Pentagon bashers ensconced in their academic and think
tank self-admiration societies, there are problems which
require correction and there is a need for better strategic
management. What can be done about these problems? Has
anyone had similar problems and if so what did they do about
it? Did they ultimately improve the situtation as they
originally intended? Despite George Santayanna's popular
prediction, we are not doomed to repeat history.
One staunch ally, Australia, recently examined Its
national strategy and force structure and is making
significant organizational changes. Not surprisingly, some
Australian problems are similar to those faced by the United
States. Although Australia's problems may be quantitatively
smaller, we may learn something from their experience.
BACKGROUND
Similarities between the United States and Australia
are boundless. Two hundred years ago, both were small
isolated colonies populated by outcasts with strong ties to
the British empire. We struggled to conquer a large land
mass with notable success. Whereas the United States ended
its love affair with Mother England rather suddenly and
forcefully, Australia nutured its relationship. Yet even
at these early stages, the kinship between the United States
and Australia was strong as attested by frequent statements
of the first Prime Minister, Edmund Barton. Although
located in the South Pacific, Australia was and is today
western in outlook, traditions and values.
To strengthen its relationship with Great Britain,
Australia adopted the "forward defense" doctrine. They were
an adjunct of Britain and the Empire's opponents were their
opponents. The theory followed that, if Australia were ever
threatened, Britain would rush to its rescue.
Australians, to their credit, supported this doctrine
vigorously and fought bravely alonside the British in the
Maori Wars in New Zealand, Sudan in 1885, the Boer War in
1899, the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, and during both
World Wars. They provided support at great financial and
personal sacrifice. During World War I, they lost 59,000
soldiers, or 1% of the entire population. They lost another
22.000 soldiers in World War II.
Britain's loss of Singapore at the onset of World War
II signaled a major change in British and Australian
relations. Britain, although reluctant to recognize their
undignified downward slide from the ranks of first rate
world powers, was absorbing world wide defeats in those
early days. It was obvious to the Australians that if
Britain could not defend itself, it would be unable to aid
Australia. This disappointing revelation arrived at an
inopportune time, as the aggressive Japanese continued their
frightening sweep southward. In a pragmatic move motivated
by the hot breath of Japan's Imperial Army and Navy,
Australia turned to the United States for protection.
Australia provided its military resources to General
MacArthur, who conducted Australia's war effort largely free
from Australian political direction, as an extension of the
U.S. war effort.
The end of World War II caused no changes in
Australia's "forward defense" doctrine, with one exception:
the United States had replaced Great Britain as its
protector. Australia posited that, unable to defend itself,
a major power was needed to provide that protection.
Australia assisted the United States during the Berlin
Airlift, fought in the Korean War, and in Vietnam.
Australia, South Korea and New Zealand were our only allies
to provide help during Vietnam. None of the United States'
European allies offered assistance.
Although Australia cooperated with Great Britain, the
withdrawal of British forces deployed west of the Suez Canal
and out of Malaysia and Singapore left the United States the
only super power in the region. One might debate whether
Britain was a super power, but for Australia comparision
shopping was not an available luxury. For their "forward
defense" concept to remain viable, it was the United States
or nothing.
In July 1969, President Nixon rocked Australia's
"forward defense" concept. On his return from a visit to
Southeast Asia, he made a brief stop in Guam and announced
that the United States would honor all treaties to which it
was a party but that our allies were expected to provide for
their own defense. Nixon's Guam Doctrine torpedoed the
basic premise on which the Australian defense doctrine was
based. ASEAN countries took the Nixon doctrine seriously
and prepared for their own defense. It was time for




Australia heeded Dirty Harry Callahan's exhortation, "a
man has got to know his limitations," and began the
difficult task of defining its limitations. Australia made
a serious and meticulous examination of its capabilities.
Could Australia defend itself? Against whom?
Australian strategists began to develop a new defense
policy based on key concepts. Australia was a regional
power in a remote part of the world, with no known enemies.
Australia's location gave it the unique advantage of a long
warning prior to any buildup or attack by neighbors. Its
neighbors were third world powers with no expansionist ic
plans. Perhaps the most difficult concept to endorse was
that Australia could no longer rely on the military
assistance of her allies in "all" circumstances.
The latter concept is one which most nations find
difficult to define. The United States deals constantly
with the disappointments imposed by its allies. The United
States has been virtually blackmailed by allies who attempt
to increase exponentially the costs of basing agreements.
Our allies have sold crucial defense technology to the
Soviets, provided Libya, Iraq and Syria with the technology
and supplies to make chemical weapons, and refused to
extradite known terrorists to the Unites States for
prosecution. The concept gels: allies support each other
when there is something to be gained (or at least not lost)
by all parties concerned.
Australia's major shift in strategic thought
precipatated a concommitant review of the force structure.
They began the planning to revamp their military
configuration as an adjunct of a larger force, and to
develop a force capable of dealing with regional conflicts
of varying scales while also covering extensive
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terrr i tor ies. During this transition and reevaluat Ion , the
Australians suffered from some of the same problems that
plague any organization undergoing strategic restructuring.
This resulted in differing opinions on every aspect of the
problem, with no concensus.
In February 1985, noted strategist Paul Dibb was tasked
by the Australian Minister for Defense, Kim Beazley, to
examine the current capabilities of the Australian Defense
Force. He was further directed to describe the current
strategic environment, develop Australia's strategy,
establish defense priorities for Australia, and, finally, to
define the force structure needed to meet those priorities.
It was a monster project and he was given one year to
complete his review. He published his findings in March
1986, a compilation of strategic and force planning concepts
under a single cover. 1
He based his planning on the following strategic
environmental and Australian assumptions:
^Australia has no identifiable direct military threat.
*A1 1 significant states in the area observe the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty and entertain no
motive to acquire a nuclear capability .
*Any massive change in this benign environment would
take at least ten years and could not occur
unnot iced.
*Global war between the super powers is highly
unlikely. There is no contingency plan to
use the Australian Defense Force in the
unlikely event of nuclear war.
*Only the United States and the Soviets have the
capability to launch an invasion of
Austral ia.
*Austral ia cannot be blockaded. There is no concern
with SLOC vulnerability or loss of
import/export trade.
^Australia is practically self sufficient in most food,
raw materials and energy resources.
Next, he defined the objectives of the Australian
Defense Force. He determined that this force must be able
to exercise complete control over the land, territorial seas
and airspace, protect Australia's resource zones, and defend
its maritime approaches. This is an immense assignment for
a small population with a limited industrial base and
defense capabilities. The Australian Defense Force is
responsible for controlling an area which includes 10% of
the earth's surface, stretching 4000 miles east to west and
3000 miles north to south.
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Although that Is a large area to cover with a limited
force, Australia faces no major enemy and the only likely
area for an attack is in the remote and unhospitable north.
Other than the United States and the Soviet Union, no nation
is capable of mounting an amphibious assault and waging a
conventional war. No nation in the region has either the
capacity or motive to provoke, much less attack and attempt
to conquer, Australia. Australia is an industrialized
western power, which would seem conducive to a fairly
comfortable situation.
In reality, it is a rather difficult situation. Once
the easily defineable conventional warfare scenarios have
been eliminated, Australia must cope with unconventional low
intensity conflicts; a predicament which is difficult to
anticipate or control. The complexities the United States
faced in Beirut and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are
analogies of difficult low intensity conflicts. Dibb
simplified Australia's problem somewhat. He determined the
one sure way not to manage these situations is with
"deterrence". In low intensity conflicts, deterrence relies
too much on the enemy's perception and values. It must be
assumed that the enemy will react sanely and holds values
over which you exercise some control; yet history has
proven that to be an insane assumption when dealing with
terrorists and other extremists. Nor does deterrence
eliminate the need for a defensive force.
The next complication Is that low intensity conflicts
can occur with little or no warning, and with varying
degrees of intensity. Nevertheless, Dlbb succinctly said
that, regardless of the speed or intensity of a low
intensity conflict, Australia's defensive posture will
remain the same and he called it a "strategy of denial".
THE STRATEGY OF DENIAL
The "strategy of denial" takes advantage of Australia's
remoteness and the hostile northern geography. It is a
strategy to deny any military operations in the sea and air
gap surrounding Australia, including preventing any
successful landing, and, when necessary, the defeat of any
landing force. The strategy presents a layered defense of
four interlocking barriers:
ttFirst . A comprehensive intelligence and surveillance
capability exists, which minimizes the
chances of a surprise attack.
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*Second . The Australian air and naval forces can
control the sea and air gap, the offshore
area surrounding Australia.
KThlrd . Defensive capabilities can deny enemy
operations in the focal areas and shipping
1 anes.
ttFourth Highly mobile and dispersed ground forces can
deny the enemy access to vital population
centers and military infrastructure.
Dlbb pointed out that this strategy is non-expansionist lc,
hence peaceful. It also conforms to the Nixon (Guam)
doctrine, the catalyst which triggered this new "strategy of
denial "
.
Having laid out the strategic environment, and the
Australian Defense Force's responsibilities and objectives,
Dibb next determined the force structure requirements that
would enable Australia to enforce the "strategy of denial".
He reasoned that this force must fulfill all peacetime
obligations, maintain an independent military capability and
provide a base for expansion should there be an increase in
tensions. The force would be maintained at varying levels
of readiness: at a high level for counterterror ist actions
and low intensity conflicts, medium level for preemptive
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strikes and low intensity conflicts in the sea and air gap,
and at a low level for larger conflicts. While desirable
for the force to be allied standardized, lnteroperabl i 1 i ty
among the Australian single services is an absolute
necessi ty
.
THE INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE FORCE
The intelligence and surveillance capability Is the
keystone of the "strategy of denial". It must be infallible
in projecting any long range military buildups by
Australia's neighbors, and ensuring against a surprise
attack. This provides Australia with a military advantage.
It requires a careful allocation of assets between current
intelligence, strategic warning and regional intelligence
data base maintenance. A combination of over-the-hor izon
radar, long range maritime patrol aircraft and naval ships
is required to maintain surveillance out to 1500 nautical
miles from the northern coast. Keeping in mind the
important role the intelligence and surveillance forces
would play as part of the "strategy of denial", Dibb,
amazingly, found that the current force level needed few
chancres.
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He envisaged a force structure for intelligence and
surveillance that included a modest investment in new
technologies, an upgrade of the electronic warfare system to
include adaptation to credible low intensity conflicts and
the establishment of a regional electronic warfare data
base. Project Jindalee, the OTH radar, was to progress from
the experimental to an operational stage and two additional
radars were required operational by the mid 1990s.
Australia's long range maritime patrol assets are
twenty P3C Orion aircraft and Dibb deemed them sufficient to
support the surveillance mission. Dibb found that Australia
could not detect submarines and he recommended the priority
development and evaluation of surface towed array sonar
systems, similar to the U.S. T-AGOS.
He recommended a massive upgrade and acceleration of
Australia's mapping and charting capabilities to include the
use of civilian contracts and acquisition of the latest
laser mapping and hydrographic equipment. Dibb decided
that, while one of Australia's defense assets was the
ruggedness and inaccessibility of its north coast, the lack
of accurate mapping and charting of the area severely
hindered Australia's ability to defend it. He recommended
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that the mapping and charting surveys be completed within 15
years.
He urged the budget gradually increase to account for
maintaining current technology as well as investing In new
technology. He believed that the coordination of
intelligence should be concentrated at the Headquarters of
the Australian Defense Force.
The over-the-hor izon radar, while excellent for long
range detection of aircraft, required more testing in its
surface craft detection capability. As Dibb repeatedly
pointed out, the most likely direction for any threat was
from the north. Therefore, there was a need for three
over-the-hor izon radars to protect Australia's northern
flank. Ultimately, they would need five radars. He also
noted that the true capabilities of the radar were not known
as it was in the test phase. Once the radar's ability to
pinpoint targets was established, the need for AEW aircraft
or other systems to direct strike and interdiction aircraft
to targets could also be determined. The over-the-hor izon
radar at Jindalee met all expectations and Australia plans
to build several more. The radar system worked so well that
Australian scientists claimed, much to the chagrin of the
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United States Air Force, that their radar can track the
Stealth aircraft. 2
The transition to combat intelligence should be
relatively simple, redirecting existing assets and
introducing reserve intelligence units.
The intelligence and surveillance system relies heavily
on access to United States intelligence information. This
agreement was in exchange for United States basing rights
for intelligence and communications stations; a mutually
beneficial arrangement. The modern technology has made
reality of the seemingly impossible task of keeping tabs on
such an immense area.
STRIKE AND INTERDICTION
After establishing a sound intelligence and
surveillance system, the next step is to build the
capability to defend against an enemy before any uninvited
arrival on the homeland. Again, Australia has unique
geographic advantages. There are only two ways to attack
Australia, by air or sea. These two realms are excellent
areas to counter any attack (assuming that you have detected
and identified the attacking forces and their intentions).
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Australia requires a strike/Interdict Ion force capable
of offensive action, when necessary, in the sea and air gap
surrounding the country. Having capable forces to conduct
that mission lets any predisposed enemies know that
Australia can maintain sovereignty over its territory and
that, if pressed, will use force to protect its interests.
Although not the primary intent, a strike and interdiction
capability may also deter regional nations with expansionist
tendencies.
Using the sea and air gap as the first line of military
overt actions assures there is little fear of harming
innocent bystanders. By limiting strikes to military
targets, possible escalation from destruction of unintended
targets (such as the civilian populace) is reduced. Once a
low intensity conflict involves the populace then sentiment,
revenge, and machismo emerge. The ease with which a lesser
developed country can obtain and effectively use high tech
weapons makes revenge a devastating option. Therefore, the
Australian strike/interdiction force is primarily oriented
towards conducting battle in the sea and air gap.
Attacking enemy land bases is a dual edged sword. It
is possibile that the conflict will be end sooner, but there
is also the great probability of escalating the conflict and
16
straining the long term relationship with a neighbor. The
intent of the strike and interdiction forces is to prevent
land attack and, failing that, to discourage escalation.
These forces must be carefully controlled, with reliance on
the timeliness and accuracy of information provided by
inte 1 1 igence.
Considering those responsibilities and limitations,
Dibb determined that the force structure of the strike and
interdiction forces would be limited by the following
parameters. During a low intensity conflict, surface ships
could police the gap against small, poorly defended surface
craft. Combatant ships are ideal because of their
endurance, good communications and surveillance
capabilities, and ability to arrest trespassers before any
conflict can escalate to armed response by either side.
This task does not require sophisticated gear. If the enemy
has an anti-ship missile capability, then aircraft and
submarines are better choices.
There is no need to maintain a strike and interdiction
capability beyond 1000 nautical miles, which is the limit of
Australia's direct military interest. There is no need for
maritime operations in the western Indian Ocean or the
northern Pacific. Should a low intensity conflict escalate,
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these boundaries would not change. The objective would
remain to intercept intruders in the sea and air gap within
the 1000 nautical mile limit with a prudent mix of surface
combatants, submarines and aircraft.
Dibb proposed that the strike force comprise two land
based squadrons of F-llls and F/A-18s, and six submarines.
The F- 111 aircraft required an update and overhaul. The
update could scale the spectrum from a minimal approach,
leaving the aircraft with basically the same offensive
capabilities, to the other extreme and, at great expense,
enhance the capability of the aircraft to the
state-of-the-art. Dibb did not consider the expensive
update necessary because of the expected low tech threat.
He believed the F- 111 was too powerful for the strike and
interdiction role. He recommended instead that the aircraft
undergo a minimal update and that Australia acquire 25
additional F/A-18 aircraft.
Six submarines were believed sufficient. At the end of
the service life of the Oberon submarines, he recommended
replacement by six new submarines. So that the submarine
force could be separated and supported, he also recommended
that an additional submarine base be established .
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MARITIME DEFENSE
The maritime defense of Australia is an extension of
the strike and interdiction force concepts. Should a battle
be fought, the sea is an excellent place to conduct it.
With heavy reliance on the timeliness and accuracy of
intelligence, a strong maritime defense force is mandatory
for a remote island nation which plans to engage any enemy
in the sea and air gap.
The probablility of a major maritime power attacking
Australia is remote and was not a planning consideration.
Because of Australia's vast coastline, it is costly to
sustain surface forces capable of rapidly responding to a
maritime low intensity conflict. The northern territories
are remote and susceptible to an enemy with even modest
attack capabilities. Escalation beyond a low intensity
conflict would likely result from an error in judgement and
the excessive use of force. Dibb noted that there was a
limited probability of any large scale maritime buildup in
the region and, therefore, no need to concentrate on
shipborne ASW and air defense capabilities. Should there be
changes in the regional situation, there would be sufficient
time to change Australia's force structure.
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Protection of shipping would be a mission of the
Australian Defense Force. Interdiction of Australian
shipping is a practical option for almost any enemy. With
the exception of the northern approaches, an area too
shallow for submarine operations, submarines would most
likely attack Australian shipping. Dlbb added that
Australia does not rely on coastal shipping to support
military operations, and the best defense against shipping
attacks would be rerouting the ships. Geography once again
favors Australia which, for practial purposes, is impossible
to blockade. While the likelihood of a mid ocean threat is
low, and could be defeated by rerouting, there might be
occasions when rerouting would not be prudent and Australia
must be able to protect the focal areas of Sydney,
Newcastle, Wollongong, Bass Strait, and the area near Cape
Leeuwin. Only in extreme cases would escort of convoys be
considered.
To protect those focal areas from submarine attack,
Dibb suggested novel ASW operations using towed array sonar
systems teamed with long range maritime patrol aircraft to
localize and attack submarine contacts. Land based ASW
helicopters would provide backup as might some ASW
helicopters stationed on non-military ships. He felt the
shipborne ASW systems were too costly, the ships too
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vulnerable to submarine attack, and that a combination of
ASW helos, LRMP and towed array ships could do the job.
Dibb was well aware of Australia's vulnerability to
mining attacks especially in the northern approaches. The
mine countermeasure forces were inadequate, unable to cope
with the threat, and needed upgading. Training should
reflect the very short warning time within which an
adversary could mount an effective mining effort. MCM
involves very complex skills, and Dibb felt that Australia
needed the capability to clear mines in three dispersed
areas simultaneously.
Yet he saw no urgent need to maintain proficiency with
defensive and offensive mining, while admitting that it
would not hurt to have a small inventory of mines to
maintain a skill level to facilitate expansion if it was
requ i red.
Dibb specified how money should be allocated to
development the MCM force by accelerating funding to provide
testing and evaluation of two prototype inshore minehunting
catamarans (MHI) and if the tests succeed, to construct four
more MHIs. Should the concept fail, urgently acquire three
minesweeps from overseas. He also urged that Australian
concepts on minesweeping be vigorously pursued. Finally, he
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recommended a Mine Warfare Center, located in Sydney, since
its harbor would be the most likely target of hostile
mi n i ng.
Dibb's view of Australia's maritime air defense is
straight forward and logical. It will be provided by land
based fighters. While ships are invaluable and provide
important presence, endurance, communications and
surveillance during a low intensity conflict, he also
pointed out that these roles do not require any air defense
capability. Ships are too vulnerable and valuable to
subject them to an environment where they require an air
defense system. His summation was that Australia will
maintain air superiority in the northern approaches with
land based fighter aircraft.
A smal 1 surface force is necessary to carry out the
maritime defense mission. In low intensity conflicts, Dibb
determined that the proper mix of surface forces would be
ten patrol boats, eight light patrol frigates (this class of
ship is in the development stage), and eight or nine
destroyers. Those ships can maintain a naval presence in
the five areas of Dampier Sound, Timor Sea, Arafura Sea,
Torres Strait, Christmas Island, and the Indian Ocean
approaches, and yet provide adequate factors of transit
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time, maintenance and upkeep periods and normal rotation and
training. The Navy would also require six Squirrel light
helos, nine Sea Kings, sixteen Seahawks, and twelve
reconnai sance helos to support the maritime mission.
While he tended to downplay the importance of high tech
weapon systems to combat low intensity conflicts, he
acknowledged the need to maintain an expansion base on which
to grow in case of significant conflict escalation. The
high capability destroyers provide a skill base for
expansion
.
The ability to operate for long periods without support
is an inherent advantage that the Navy enjoys and maintains.
Construction of a modest naval base in the northwest would
enhance this capability, as would the purchase of a cheap
tanker. The Navy must be able to refuel and rearm at sea,
and needs a 6000 to 7000 ton replenishment ship. Dibb also
urged a further study for a tender to provide alternative
repair and support facilities to deployed elements of the
fleet. This tender would enable the Navy to support
prolonged operations in two remote area simultaneously.
Dibb suggested the main submarine base be moved to the west
coast, which would better support northern area patrols. He
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also believed that the major fleet concentration be in
Jervis Bay.
The Naval reserves (seven percent of the total
service force) required only minor adjustments. Since the
Naval reserves are used primarily in Naval Control of
Shipping and Naval Intelligence, he doubted the merit of
tasking the reserves with the entire MCM mission. He
encouraged a core of permanent naval manpower using
reservists to support the MCM mission.
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE
Should the enemy penetrate the sea and air gap, the
next line of defense is the continental air force, with and
in support of the ground forces. A busy mul t i -tal ented
force, the continental air force provides maritime air
defense as well as strike and Interdiction.
Again, Dibb relied on logic to determine where an
adversary would be most likely to attack. He would likely
attack the most remote, lightly defended area. The enemy
would be attempting to make a political statement rather
than seeking any real military advantage. He might attempt
to insert paratroopers. Still, the mission of Australia's
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continental air defense would be to locate the enemy and
intercept him with a high probability of success.
Australia's remote location again proffers a strategic
benefit. Based on regional capabilities and geographic
position. Dibb concluded that there was no need for many
aircraft. He found a need for three air defense squadrons,
located in Learmont-Derby , Darwi n-Tindal 1 and Cape York. To
support three squadrons would require 75 F/A-18 aircraft; 16
per squadron, 13 for attrition, 12 in a operational
conversion unit, and two in a research and development unit.
Dibbs further asserted that a ground based radar system
be acquired and installed to cover the approaches to Darwin
and Tindall, but saw no need to increase the ground based
surface-to-air missile systems.
He voiced a need for two mobile radar systems to
support two fighter bases but delayed making any decision on
the need for AEW aircraft until all the OTHR testing was
completed. He identified the need for additional air-to-air
refueling assets and recommended the conversion of an
additional four B707s to bring the total of inflight
refuel ing-capabl e B707 aircraft to eight.
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He found that the Air Force reserve program required
some expansion in aircrews, maintenance crews and airfield
defense units.
CONTINENTAL GROUND DEFENSE
The ground defense of Australia is a complex issue.
The fear of land attack by Japan during World War II has
never been forgotten. The Army force structure has
traditionally been based on defending Australia from large
scale invasion. Dibb's approach was radically different.
He averred that the capture of the mainland is not a
planning contingency. Regional countries have neither the
desire nor capability to wage a conventional war. Dibb
believed the most likely threat to be low intensity
conflict. While he concurred that a low intensity conflict
could escalate by increased conflicts or increased intensity
of raids and might even involve higher fire power, the
escalation is well below the conventional warfare level.
Thus, basing the force structure of the Army on the remote




If the only remote possibility of attack Is a low
intensity conflict, then the argument could be pursued that
there is little need for an army. What Is needed is some
beefed-up police force specifically designed to handle
terrorist threats.
Dibb chose a middle ground. While it would take ten
years for any of Australia's neighbors to develop the
capacity to attack Australia, and that buildup would be
noticed, and while there was no evidence that anyone intends
to develop or use that capability, he recognized the
pervasive fear that a major assault could occur. Inferior
intelligence, the defeat of the maritime and strike forces,
or the government's tendency to act slowly add fuel to this
particular fear. Therefore, he thoughtfully envisioned an
Army capable of coping with counter-terrorist operations as
well as providing for base expansion in the unlikely event
that Australia is threatened by organized military forces.
These ground forces must have excellent communications,
surveillance and reconnaisance capabilities, and light but
adequate firepower. The most important characteristic of
this force must be high mobility, including helicopters and
paratroopers. Finally, this force should require minimal
logistic support for short duration engagements. When sited
27
at suitable strategic locations throughout the mainland, the
ground force would be prepared to counter small raids
covering large areas.
Since an enemy might insert a small ground force
without any warning, Australia's ground force must be able
to immediately perform four missions. They must protect
Australia's air and maritime assets; defend the civilian
population and key locations in northern Australia; provide
an offensive capability to contain incursions and defeat
enemy forces close to their landing areas; and contain
limited skills and expansion capability to fight a
conventional land battle, even though a remote probability.
Dibb believed the present number in the Army was
correct, but that the training, organization, and equipment
was lacking. There are six regular battalions . He felt
that the highly mobile Australian Operational Defense Force
was the correct organization structure for most of the Army,
and this concept should be studied and developed. Although
he recognized the need for an expansion base and the
maintenance of certain critical skills, he saw no need for
the Sixth Battalion to be organized, equipped and trained
for conventional warfare and amphibious operations.
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He opined that the Army should be light, fast and
mobile but was over-mechanized. He recommended a reduction
of light armoured fighting vehicles from the 630 on hand to
somewhere between 450 to 500, a number he considered
adequate. He recommended tanks be reduced from 103 to 50,
and the excess mechanized equipment be turned over to
reserve forces. He remarked that the acquistion of 66
pieces of field artillery for the reserves was excessive and
said 46 pieces would be adequate. There was no priority
need for fixed wing close air support and a very low need
for medium range artillery pieces.
What the Army needed was an increase in regional ground
surveillance forces and two companies of tactical helos
which would require acquistion of an additional 36 aircraft.
The high mobility of the ground force depends on air
transport. Dibb wanted the 22 Caribou and 12 Hercules
aircraft replaced by 20 new Hercules type aircraft. He also
acknowledged that amphibious insertions were unlikely and
that there was no need to maintain an amphibious force other
than a bare bones unit for an expansion base. He did not
recommend replacement of any amphibious craft.
Although it appears that ground transport is adequate,
a prolonged engagement would probably require an Increased
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airlift capability. Should the need arise, Dibb noted that
Australia could use commercial air assets. The Army also
needs to start training in the northern area and he
suggested the acquisition of a training area in western New
South Wales.
If Australia's north was the most likely place for an
attack, then it must be made more defensible and a less
likely target. Dibb agreed that a regular infantry
battalion should be based in the Darwin-Tindal 1 area.
The Army reserves, which represent 44% of the total
force, required the most reformation. Dibb identified the
largest single problem, one which the Army was working
diligently to correct, as the change to the total force
concept which would include the integration and affiliation
of reserve units with the regular Army. The reserve force
would fill in for the regular Army when deployed to low
intensity hot spots, requiring reservists to assume the
security of key installations.
Although the number of personnel involved was
unchanged, Dibb's recommendations had profound effects on
the remaining aspects of the Army. Fewer big guns, fewer
tanks, fewer armoured fighting vehicles. Dibb was
recommending a low tech, ungl amorous Army. By not having to
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operate and support all that high tech gear, he was making
it easier to "be all that you could be". The mission now
called for a lightly armed, highly mobile force which could
be supported for extended periods In remote locations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Dibb was also directed to study the effectiveness of
the command and control structure of the Australian Defense
Force. He found the command and control structure somewhat
antiquated, and recommended that the shift to a joint
command structure continue. He acknowledged the single
service arrangement as appropriate to peacetime training and
support needs, but the short lead times encountered in low
intensity conflicts demanded the establishment of a joint
command force, including a new generation computer based
command and control system for the chief of the defense
force
.
Since the north is the most likely location for an
attack, it needs an embryonic joint headquarters designed to
handle low intensity conflicts. Finding no need for
immediate change, the conversion to a joint force could be
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done with minimal resource and manpower implications and
should reduce interservlce rivalries.
Australia needs updated, reliable communications. Dlbb
concurred with the proposed increased use of satellite
communication (AUSSAT), but recommended the retention of HF
as back up
.
The Dibb Review pointed out the paucity of planning for
any low intensity conflict. The latest planning document
was the War Book, designed for national mobilization and
last updated in 1956. He identified three areas to be
included in the planning to cope with the current strategic
environment. These are wartime administration, military
expansion as a result of an escalating conflict, and the
establishment of war reserve and stockpiling criteria.
Dibb, again noting no imminent threats, wrote that no
major adjustment to the government structure would be
necesssary in the event of a low intensity conflict. What
is needed are general guidelines to highlight potential
defense requirements. Examples of these guidelines are:
-military force would be used against external military
threats.
-the Federal and State governments remain responsible
for government and civil administration.
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-there is a need to streamline some (not all)
administrative procedures to assist defense.
-internal security and law would remain a civil
responsibi 1 i ty
.
General guidelines are all that are needed now and they
should be designed to handle low intensity conflicts as
opposed to national mobilization to defeat an invasion
force
.
Dibb identified a planning requirement for civil sector
augmentation, specifically the coordination of civil
maritime and air resources. This planning is of a general
nature, but had been poorly done on a piecemeal basis.
LOGISTICS
"The move from a pol icy of forward defense in
association with allies to the concept of self reliance in
the defense of Australia has had some of its most important
effects in the support area," stated Dibb.^ Although no
longer worried about transporting and supporting its forces
outside of Australia, it now had to be done without allied
help over a vast continent.
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The war reserve stocks and the stockpiling of critical
materials was last updated in 1963. The stalemate, in part,
was caused by differing individual service policies and
philosophies. A precise, comprehensive approach to planning
for war reserves was required. Dibb reasoned that this
approach should be based on credible low intensity conflicts
of three and six month durations. Consideration must be
accorded to increased training readiness, the remoteness and
dispersion of the operating environment and realistic rates
of effort and stock usage. Dibb cited the limited number of
military targets likely to be encountered during a low
intensity conflict, an important factor in calculating the
number of missiles in the stockpile.
In a 1980 Memorandum of Understanding on logistic
support, the United States acknowledges the importance to
Australia of uninterrupted supply lines. With that
Memorandum, and less extensive but similar agreements with
Europe, along with Australia's unique strategic environment,
Dibb concluded that there was no justification for large
scale stockpiling.
The logistic support of the Australian Defense Force is
concerned with provisioning clothing, rations, medical
facilities, ammunition, transport, repair, maintenance of
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equipment, and technical and scientific support. The
justification of this costly and complex system rests in its
potential to support military operations. Although there
are less expensive ways of providing peacetime support such
as lower inventories and centralized services, these would
hinder sustained deployment and combat effectiveness.
One area which Dibb was unable to evaluate was logistic
support. He found no way to assess the sustalnabl 1 1 ty of
the force in a low intensity conflict. The problems are in
two distinct areas, each of which has a solution. The
Australian Defense Force has no experience with low
intensity conflict. There are no historical data. Dibb
concluded that there is a need for a series of exercises in
the north to find what would be needed and to uncover
possible surprises.
The second problem is a self-inflicted wound. Dibb
found no similarity between the accounting/supply methods of
the three services. This, of course, made it extremely
difficult (impossible for Dibb's task force) to assess the
sustai nabi 1 i ty of the forces In a low Intensity conflict.
He recommended an immediate Integration of the supply and
support systems of all three services.
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Australia's civil defense readiness can handle the low
intensity conflicts on which Dibb based his strategy. The
civil defense requirements are limited and fall into the
same category for handl ing accidents and natural disasters.
More substantial conflict would allow sufficient lead time
to shore up civil defense with specialized skills. Dibb
found no reason to invest in protective NBC measures for the
Australian population, since nuclear war is a remote
possibi 1 i ty
.
He insisted that the civil infrastructure must be
designed to support defense interests, and that this can be
achieved without being subsidized by defense funding. He
endorsed the use of private contractors, which would release
military personnel for other activities. He advocated
defense equipment manufactured in Australia, which would
relieve technical manpower pressures in the services. Other
areas where civil assets could be used are in
telecommunications, construction and civil engineering, and
rail, air, and sea transport. This interweaving of civil





Dibb was tasked to evaluate the reserve forces. His
strategy relies upon the avail abilty of reserve forces to
provide an expansion base and support military operations.
Without the reserves, there are not enough forces to make
the "strategy of denial" effective.
He weighed the contributions a viable reserve force
can offer. Among them surge capacity, an expansion base for
certain skills, an ability to protect key installations and
settlements, especially in the north, and the provision of
indepth local knowledge. He observed the liabilities
associated with the reserve force, which include
unavailability on short notice, reluctance of the
politicians to call-up reserves, and their limited training
levels. Dibb underscored that it would take at least six
months after recall before an average reserve unit could be
prepared for operational deployment.
The Dibb plan required an expansion base from which the
Australian Defense Force could grow, should strategic
circumstances dictate. The reserve force structure must
therefore respond to the regional security environment. It
must also be able to absorb initially all the credible
contingencies, and surging to higher levels of activity.
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The force also must be sensitive to technical manpower
bottle necks, which would be difficult to expand rapidly.
Dibb highlighted the political problems associated with
calling-up reserves. During a low intensity conflict, the
recall of reserves could be construed as an escalatory
measure, leading to an increase in tension. Yet, those
strategic circumstances, which would indicate increasing
tensions, identify the time when the talents of reservists
supporting the regular force could be best used.
Dibb concluded that there is an urgent need for
appropriate legislation authorizing a limited call-up of
reserves during peace time, specifically for those low
intensity conflicts which fall short of formal declarations
of defense emergencies.
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
Dibb noted that his review was not tasked to suggest
changes with cost savings in mind. He believed that, where
possible, defense spending should be dictated by the
strategic situation. However, there are competing demands
for limited capital and defense needs are only one among
many. Nevertheless, he applauded the intent of the five
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year defense plans for financial planning and lamented that
the political process has eroded the spending power of such
plans by forcing implusive (and short sighted) changes. He
pointed out that, when the expectations of the approved FYDP
are not matched by budget allocations, defense planning is
disrupted, wasting managerial effort and resources and
causing misunderstanding and tension between the civilian
and service elements of the Defense Department. It is also
frustrating to the general public who have a difficult time
balancing the costs and the lack of an indent
i
fiable threat.
Australia spends approximately three percent of its
Gross Domestic Product on defense. This falls in the middle
range of the percent spent by NATO countries, and three
times that spent by Japan. Dibb reported that the amount in
the FYDP was sufficient to support the changes recommended
by his review, and demonstrated the review's feasibilty and
financial responsibility.
DIBB'S SUMMARY
Dibb ended his recommendations with a statement that
the review did not uncover any major decisions or purchases
which needed reversal. His statement is not quite true.
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His recommendation that the F-lll force receive only a
minimal update as opposed to the state-of-the-art update
struck F-lll proponents as a major reversal. The Army also
sensed a major shift in direction and emphasis. He
delivered a broadside at the Navy, and found no need for an
aircraft carrier and only a limited need for the high tech
complex destroyer. He recommended all three services
integrate their supply and support systems. That means
either scraping two systems and adopting the remaining one
or discarding all three and building a new one. Such a
major shift in accounting methods deserves description as a
major decision reversal
.
Dibb digressed from his primary assignment by
h igh 1 igh i t i ng some important attitudes on the effective use
of manpower, which consumes almost 40% of the defense
budget. Encouraging further reductions in the Defence
Department's civilian force, he urged wider use of contract
civilians for support services such as logistics, catering
and repair to free military personnel for military tasks.
Alluded to the almost 25% of the officer corps driving desks
in Canberra, he pointed out the imbalance between the number




Dibb found that while Australia Is among the most
secure countries In the world, there are future
uncertant ies. However, those uncertantles are for
assessment by the intelligence community and should not be
used for planning.
He identified the need to keep the public informed and
strongly recommended publishing a Defense White Paper.
Finally, Dibb admitted that the determination of an
appropriate defense force is an exceedingly complex isssue,
not amenable to mathematical precision. The review
recommendations sought to build on previous studies and,
with some reordering of the force structure priorities,
Australia would have the forces to defend itself into the
1990s.
THE CRITICS
The Dibb Review was not without its critics. In August
1986, at the Chief of Defence Force's Conference in
Canberra, Ross Babbage and Desmond Ball presented their
reviews of Dibb's work. Australia did not have an approved
strategy, and a Defense White Paper would not be published
until March 1987. There was still time for fine tuning
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Dlbb's strategic plan. Both Babbage and Ball were generally
complimentary of the reveiw, remarking it was long overdue
and well done. However, they also felt that the review
contained fatal flaws for which they had recommended
sol ut i ons.
Babbage theorized that Dibb's "strategy of denial", as
a strictly defensive concept, was inadequate to favorably
end a low Intensity conflict. 4 Although the environment of
northern Australia was advantageous to its defense, the
vastness of the area might overstretch Dibb's defense force
and give an advantage to an enemy. Babbage added that
several regional countries already had the capability to
wage a taxing, low intensity conflict. Predicting that the
layered, interlocking defense would be more like a sieve
than a barrier, he concluded that total reliance on this
"strategy of denial" during a protracted low intensity
conflict would exceed the capabilities of the Australian
Defense Force, be difficult to sustain both in economic and
social costs, and, most importantly, lacked the leverage
necessary to end the conflict to Australia's advantageous.
^
He next objected to Dibb's categorization of the strike
and interdiction forces as a defensive unit. Babbage stated
that these forces were clearly offensive and risked
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escalating the conflict. Most Importantly, whether these
forces were defined as offensive or defensive, he cited the
inconclusive results of past strategic bombings both In
Vietnam and during World War II, cautioning that strike and
interdiction forces alone would not bring an adversary to
end the conf 1 let
.
6
Babbage proposed a solution to this problem by using
flexible response options with strong potential for forcing
an opponent to sue for peace quickly but which would not
seriously risk escalation nor provide strong incentives for
hostile major powers to rush to an opponent's assistance.
The options he proposed are the disruption of internal lines
of communication, mining, and supporting dissident elements.
Adopting his strategy would require little revision to the
Dibb's version. He recommended procuring an offensive
mining capability and creating a second Special Air Service
regiment
.
I agree with Babbage' s premise that a pure "strategy of
denial" may not be sufficient to end a low intensity
conflict, and with his observation that strategic bombing
has inconclusive results. Yet, I am hard pressed to concur
that mining is a non-offensive weapon which would not
escalate the war and, combined with other means of leverage,
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would be sufficient to end a low intensity conflict.
Certainly, to mine a nation's territorial waters is an
offensive and escalatory act of war which might draw
international disapproval. Iran's use of mines is an
example of exactly this situation and the ensuing
international reaction.
At the same conference, Desmond Ball's criticisms of
the Review followed those of Babbage . He found the Review
lacking in three areas. First, it lacked counterof fensi ve
operations. Second, the assumptions were flawed concerning
the long warning times and long defense preparation times
for high level contingencies. Last, he disagreed with some
particulars of Dibb's choices of equipment requirements. 7
His first disagreement joined with Babbage's criticism
that the "strategy of denial" lacked leverage. Ball averred
that, while a defensive posture can avert defeat, it is
unlikely to secure a victory. However, he was keen on the
F-lll strike capability. He urged that the F-lll receive
the full modernization upgrade instead of the minimal
upgrade proposed by Dibb, a view supported strongly by the
RAAF. 8 He made no mention of the escalatory potential of
such strikes. An advocate of air power, Ball also disagreed
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with Dibb's dismissal of the need for AEW aircraft and fixed
wing close air support.
While Ball agreed that Australia is one of the most
secure countries and faces no Identifiable threat, he did
not agree that there will be a sufficient warning to prepare
for higher levels of conflict. He explained that many low
level conflicts contain the seeds of rapid escalation. He
observed that Hitler's rise to power and the resulting
costly World War took place in just over six years. 9
Astutely. Ball also noted that warning indicators are often
ambiguous. He concluded that the expansion base of the
Australian Defense Force should not depend on long warning
t imes.
Ball was skeptical of Dibb's overestimate of the OTH
radar ef f ect i venes. He recalled that the OTH radar, Project
Jindalee, has limitations and inadequacies. He recounted
the constantly changing ionosphere causes frequent
degradations and interruptions in the radar's operation.
There is also a large skip zone. The radar cannot identify
contacts or determine altitude. 10 Finally, he said that
this radar is vulnerable to a spectrum of electronic
countermeasures. He concluded that the AEW aircraft are
needed to compensate for the shortcomings of the OTH radar.
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However, he recommended delaying procurement until testing
on Project Jindalee was completed so that a comprehensive
list of AEW capabilities could be compiled. He also
recommended following the AEW aircraft procurements of the
United Kingdom, Japan and Canada.
Ball maintained that even a low level conflict requires
fixed wing close air support, and that few helicopter
gunships proposed by Dibb were inadequate. He was also
dissatisfied with air base defense and the lack of civil
infrastructure and declared that more work was needed in
these areas.
Desmond Ball had one final concern. He perceived a
lack of public interest concerning the defense of Australia.
There was no "critical mass" of interested people. He
believed that the Australian Defense Force needs the
illimitable asset of an informed and confident public.
GOVERNMENT ACTION
Disregarding the candid criticisms and recommendations
of Ball and Babbage , the Minister for Defense, Kim C.
Beaz 1 ey , adopted and slightly embellished the entire Dibb's
Review, and printed it as a White Paper under the title of
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"The Defence of Australia 1987". This policy paper defined
the master strategy for the defense of Australia, and
reported that the shift in priorities would occur over the
next ten to twenty years. It also expanded upon the role of
the country in defense force support from the aspects of
infrastructure, logistics, science and technology, and
posited the expected relationship between defense and
Australian industry. The paper redefined many terms and
stated that the offensive capabilities of the self defense
force would be used when appropriate.
The Dibb review was a major success. Beazley's policy
paper crowed, "it drew together all the separate
considerations of self-reliance over the last decade or more
and proposed an achievable and cost effective approach to
force structure planning. Its main recommendations for
developing a self-reliant force structure form the basis of
this Policy Information Paper and the Government's defence





I have two principle criticisms of the Dibb Review.
First, I am not convinced that the region surrounding
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Australia is as benign and non threatening as described by
Dibb. Second, there is an excessive reliance on the ability
of their intelligence system to detect changes in the
environment and provide sufficient time to tailor the
Australian Defense Force as the situation dictates. I also
find it incredible that the results of an independent review
would be adopted unanimously by the government.
I have the advantage of three years hindsight from
which to judge Dibb's regional strategic environment
predictions. Fiji suffered two coups in 1987, and there is
still racial tension between the Melanesians and the
Indians. In November the same year, General Rabuka, leader
of the two previous coups, let it be known that he was ready
to lead yet another overthrow attempt. During spring of
1987. Australian police uncovered a Fijian arms smuggling
network involving hundreds of Fijians in Australia. This
ring was "exporting" arms of Soviet or East European origin
to Fiji. An article in the 27 January 1989 National Review
reported that there was a support network led by the
pro-Soviet Socialist Party and the Trotskyist Socialist
Party of Australia.
The Kanaks, the largest ethnic group in New Caledonia,
have boycotted elections, chaffed under the rule of the
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French Republic, and clashed repeatedly and violently with
local soldiers. 12 Vanuatu has courted both the Soviets and
Libyans, threatened and snubbed France and Australia, and
seen its economy deteriorate dangerously. Kiribati has
chosen a similar economic and diplomatic course. Even
closer to Australia, there have been pro-Soviet rumblings in
Papua New Guniea. The border squabbles between PNG and
Indonesia over Irian Jaya are chronic.
Indonesia, Austral la's natural buffer to the north,
remains a relatively closed authoritarian country unlike the
other members of ASEAN. Thailand is establishing a closer
military relationship with China. They have held military
consultations, and Bangkok is purchasing from China 30
tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers, and an undisclosed
but sizable number of antiaircraft guns. Thailand was also
interested in the purchase of F-7 jet fighters and three
submarines. 13 With the purchase of imported high tech
military hardware, the Thai military leaders are committing
themselves to a long term relationship with China. This new
relationship has particularly worried Indonesia which views




Although Australia sustains a bilateral modified ANZUS
treaty with New Zealand, the United States continues to
distance itself from New Zealand over its declared status as
a -'nuclear free' country. The United States has
significantly reduced intelligence cooperation, restricted
New Zealand's access to the U.S. Departments of State and
Defense, and reduced the military training and education
previously provided New Zealand. The price tag of New
Zealand's political decision is a staggering $100 million
annually, and caused a decline in operational efficiency and
lowered morale in the New Zealand armed services. 14 New
Zealand has only recently begun to build its own satellite
interception station at Waihopai. 1 ^
Interestingly, this Kiwi stance has not effected the
favorable trade policy between the United States and New
Zealand. Although New Zealand claims to be anti-nuclear but
not anti-U.S., the United States will not soften its
military support attitude towards New Zealand. It hopes
that this will act as a deterrent to other U. S. allies who
question the wisdom of permitting nuclear weapons in their
countries, however temporary that may be. 1 ^ New Zealand has
shown no inclination to reverse its decision and continues
to sulk and protest. This year, peace activists in New
Zealand demanded that the US Naval Observatory built on
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South Island be dismantled. 17 The leaders of the protest,
Scientists Against Nuclear Arms and the Peace Movement
Aotearoa, claimed that the data gathered at the observatory
are used for missile targeting. More disturbing, despite
the United State's harsh treatment of New Zealand, wide
spread anti-nuclear sentiment prevails in the region as
evidenced by the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
CSPNFZ). 18
To the west of Australia, India has engaged in a large
military build up, particularly a buildup of naval forces.
India now has two carrier task forces and is considering
building a third. 19 They have demonstrated the proficiency
of their armed forces in Sri Lanka and recently in the
Maldives. This force certainly exceeds that needed for
coastal defense.
Australia too has been affected by the proposals of a
persuasive Gorbachev. Canberra has received applications
for up to 50 Soviet fishing boats to use Australian port
facilities, and a request for landing rights for the Soviet
Airline, Aeroflot. 20 The Labour government's Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, has
informed neighboring countries that the development of trade
with Moscow will not be opposed. 21 Although the National
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Party leader, Ian Sinclair, attacked the new policy as
'recklessly indifferent to strategic and political realities
of Australia's neighboring region', the seed was already
p 1 anted.
Obviously, the region is not benign. There are 22
small island countries in the region, the majority of which
are run by fragile, dependent governments. It is an
extremely dynamic region exhibiting all the problems
associated with developing third world nations. Without
social, economic and political stability, military stability
cannot ex i st
.
My second criticism of the Dibb Review is closely
connected to the political stability of the region. I
believe that the environment can deteriorate with
extraordinary speed, almost overnight. And, this change can
occur without forewarning. Political turmoil in Fiji
surprised the Australians. 22 The intelligence community is
not all-knowing and tends to hedge their bets.
The failures of the United States intelligence system
are well known. Eisenhower was informed of the potential of
a Castro victory in Cuba long after time had elapsed to
prevent that occurence. Carter was shocked by the Iranian
revolution which mortally wounded his presidency. Nixon
52
received poor estimates of Soviet intercontinental ballistic
missile deployments and pointedly asked, "What the hell do
those clowns do out there in Langley?" 23 For Australia,
which relies heavily on U.S. intelligence, the message
should be clear that intelligence estimates are just that-
neither timely nor consistently accurate.
The combination of an unstable, rapidly deteriorating
political environment, with easy access to high tech, yet
easy to operate, weapons is a devasting characteristic of
today's low intensity conflict. Terrorism is an easily
exportable technology. Chemical warfare, the poor man's
nuclear bomb, is within the reach of third world nations. 24
Iraq killed 5000 people in one day with gas. The
combination of thiodiglycol and hydrocloric acid produces
mustard gas. Yet both these chemicals have legitimate uses
and are sold commercially and exported. Allies have been
guilty of supplying both chemicals and technology to
unstable governments to produce poison gas.
A high tech weapon In the hands of a low tech army can
cause significant damage, and dramatically provide the
tactical edge. In Afghanistan, the Stinger missile system
proved to be the decisive factor, tilting the war in favor
of the guerrillas. 25 The Mujaheddin, hiding in mountain
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retreats (extremely rugged and remote areas) Impervious to
Soviet tank and artillery attacks, negated the Soviet's
advantage with the arrival of this missile system in the
spring of 1986. The best of its type, the Stinger is
accurate, easy to use and devastated Soviet air assets. The
Soviet's retreat (withdrawal) from Afghanistan in February
1989, is a testimony to the effect of such weapons. Stinger
has also been credited with the recent turnaround in Angola.
Unfortunately, these same weapons, an unknown number of
which remain in the hands of the Mujaheddin, could easily
find its way into the the eager hands of another guerrilla
group
.
Although I disagree with these two foundations of the
Review, I agree with the force structure recommended by
Dibb. Nevertheless, I believe that it important to
recognize a weakness. The environment is not benign. The
intelligence community is not infallible. There may not be
time to change the force structure to meet new threats. The
trade-offs must be identified and balanced. Although Dibb,
perhaps Intentionally, did not identify trade-offs and
alternatives, he chose a prudent starting point from which
to develop force structure.
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One does not have to be suspicious or pessimistic to be
troubled by the government's acceptance of the entire Dlbb
Review. The 1987 White Paper merely fleshed out and
wordsmithed the Dlbb product. Were the Dibb committee and
the government in cahoots? Was Paul Dibb Beaz ley's lapdog?
Australia's use of an independent commission in not
unique. President Reagan demonstrated the skillful use of
the findings of independent commissions to support some of
his controversial policies. There was the Kissinger
Commission on Central America to support his policy to
provide military aid; the Scowcroft Commission to convince
Congress that the MX missile was the correct choice; and the
Tower Commission, which found that members of the NSC staff
had run amuck without the consent or knowledge of the
President
.
Following the same line of reasoning, a conclusion
might be drawn (but not proven) that Dlbb posed as a public
relations front for a force restructuring which Defense
Secretary Beazley already intended to implement. Adding
weight to this conclusion is that Dibb restructured the
force with no absolute changes in manpower requirements and
(even more incredible) within budget! Nevertheless, the
point is made only for possible historical interest.
55
LESSONS LEARNED
My purpose In examining the Dibb Review was to Identify
any lessons which could be used within the United States
Department of Defense. Dibb created a new national strategy
and defined the force structure needed to support that
strategy. However, the creation of a plan Is only the first
step in strategic management. As in the old management
axiom, "you plan your work then work your plan." Strategic
management is a three step dance. You must have not only a
realistic plan, but an organization capable of executing the
plana and a means of updating the plan as the strategic
environment changes.
From a strategic management viewpoint, the Dibb Review
provided the Initial ground work. He defined the goals and
the plan. The second step was to implement that plan over a
ten to twenty year span. Three years after the review, the
restructuring of the force appears to be moving along at a
steady pace. Following Dibb's recommendations, the center
of gravity of the Australian Defense Force is shifting
north. Air bases at RAAF Learmonth, RAAF Curt in and RAAF
Tindal are operational leaving only the completion of Cape
York to complete the ring. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment will
move north in 1991 from Holsworthy in New South Wales to
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Darwin, Northern Territory. The Northern Command (NORCOM)
has been organized and located in Darwin2^. Patrol boats
and other naval craft are homeported at Cairns and Darwin.
The Air Force has completed two thirds of the F/A-18
purchase. 27 The Navy is building eight new frigates.
Construction began this year of the first Australian
type 471 submarine with an expected launching scheduled In
1994. The five remaining boats will be launched during
1995-1999. The Air Force has ordered sixteen Harpoon
simulators. The simulator was developed by the Defense
Science and Technology Organization of the Australian
Department of Defense. The arrival of 36 Army Blackhawk
helicopters is expected soon.
Australia extended for ten more years the agreement
under which the United States operates the Nurrungar
satellite control ground station and the Pine Gap facility,
where intelligence gathering satellites are operated. 28
This provides Canberra with access to this sophisticated
electronic information gathering facility. 29 Australia has
experienced a rapid growth in the defense industry and is
faced with a lack of skilled workers and managers.
Unfortunately, the most likely source of manpower is the
military. However, Australia is considering loosening its
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immigration laws and attempting to lure major defense and
aerospace companies from Europe.
Not surprisingly, there have been slight snags In this
restructuring caused primarily by the three roadblocks of
insufficient funding, a shrinking labor force and manpower
hemorrages from each of the services. The strategy requires
major long term capital investment and is absorbing almost
one-third of the Australian defense budget. The approved
budgets do not support such intense capital spending and
several programs have been delayed and perhaps eventually
may be cancel 1 ed.
According to Air Marshal David Evans, the budget
problem is caused by two acts of the Australian
government. 30 First, the defense budget has not been
allocated the growth necessary to fund the capital equipment
programs. Second, is the refusal to reduce the capital
equipment programs at the expense of personnel programs.
This caused a critical loss of skilled personnel (pilots
primarily) over the last three years, and a damaging decline
in exercises and training. Evans claims that it will take
the RAAF ten to fifteen years to recover the expertise and
skill levels lost during the last three years, and estimated
that the Army and Navy have suffered similarly.
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Determining if Australia is capable of taking the third
step of refining and managing the plan is much harder to
evaluate. Is Australia's force planning process continuous
and capable of making adjustments for the changing
environment? More Importantly, is the structure In place
adequate to effectively use these restructed forces during
low intensity conflicts?
Those al 1 - important questions lack complete answers,
unless one can accept the results of war games as conclusive
evidence or, perhaps even worse, accept the opinions of
armchair strategists. However, those organizational
problems which allegedly plague the United States'
Department of Defense can also be found in Australia's.
Attempts to smooth out the decisionmaking and management
processes in accordance with the Dibb recommendations are
st i 1 1 in progress.
Ross Babbage reports that the weaknesses in defense
planning, which prompted the Minister for Defense to task
Dibb to conduct an external review, still exist today, three
years after the report. 31 The Dibb Review concluded that
the defense decisionmaking process is deficient and
unsatisfactory. Obviously, lacking the capability to
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internally formulate and update strategy and force structure
severely handicaps Australia's Department of Defense. 32
Sample problems within the Australian Department of
Defense are among the findings of the 1987 Australian Joint
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trader^3
The structure of the defense establ ishment ensures that
policy making proceeds by a process of
confrontation and bargaining rather than mutual
cooperation and collaboration between military and
civil ians.
Joint staffs are not in sufficiently strong position to
lead and direct the development of operational
requirements and military planning.
The separate planning and policy staffs of the single
services are areas of potential duplication and
conflict and make it difficult to promulgate a
unified view. They also encourage institutional
rigidity.
There is insufficient involvement of operational
commanders and their staffs in the higher defense
decisionmaking process.
The committee studied the United States' efforts to improve
the joint process. It is safe to assume that the results in
Australia are inconclusive and that there is still some fine
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tuning to be done before valid lessons can be gleaned from
its experience in the integration of their forces.
Evaluating its strategic management, Australia still
has changes to make. The Dibb Review was a spectacular
first step. While the plan is still in its infancy at age
three, it is not too early to note that Australia's ability
to execute, refine and manage that plan must grow and
mature
.
Although the differences between the regional
responsibi 1 t ies of Australia and the global responsibilities
of the United States logically prevent any direct comparison
of strategy, there is a basic lesson which can be drawn from
Australia's experience with the Dibb Review. The United
States needs to task an independent, nonpartisan commission
with the development of a new national strategy.
First, we must agree that we need a new strategy.
While there are many scholars who claim that the United
States has not had a national strategy since the early
1960s, and further claim that we lacked the national resolve
to adopt that strategy34
, I wi 1 1 have no difficulty in
reaching a concensus agreement that, at the very least, our
national strategy is overdue for review and revision. The
National Security Council is conducting a review of U.S.
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national security and defense policies. Chronic third world
low intensity conflicts, the potential reduction in the
Soviet threat, and budget pressures demand the reexamination
of the U.S. worldwide strategic role. As Gene LaRocque, the
controversial director of the Center for Defense
Information, wrote, "...we simply have not had a coherent
national military strategy against which we could adequately
measure the adequacy of our force structure. Without a
strategy, we have by default substituted the dollar as a
measure of adequacy. "35
Assuming that there is a need to devise a new national
strategy, why must it be done by an independent commission?
The reason is elementary. Due to the incredible complexity
of strategy formulation and the design and current posture
of our political system, the product of any government body,
although well intentioned, would be flawed by bipartisanship
and self interests. The Joint Chiefs cannot agree with
President Bush over the concept of "competitive
strategies". 36 Representative John G. Rowland, a Republican
and Connecticut's only voice on the powerful House Armed
Services Committee, acknowledges that congressmen always
fight for projects that generate money for their districts,
whether they are needed or not. "Political pork is very
important: it's reality. There isn't a congressman out
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there who Isn't fighting for his own contractors." 37 Former
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, believes that
interservice rivalries sap U.S. combat effectiveness by 10
to 15 percent, and other analysts assert that the problem
could have catastrophic consequences the next time the
military swings into action. Brown does not believe that
this problem is caused by a lack of patriotism or good
intentions, but rather the "belief of each service that it
alone has figured out how to win the war." 38
Critics of an independent commission give two reasons
why the selection of that method would not be a wise choice.
First, they point with deadly accuracy to the failings of
past independent commissions. I agree with their
observation, having earlier outlined how these commissions
have been used. The heralded Economic Commission failed to
solve the budget dilemma, and produced not one but two
opposing (partisan) reports. Second, critics point to the
underwhelming conclusions of the Commission On Integrated
Long-Term Strategy. 39 Once again I agree with their
criticism. "Discriminate Deterence" was a method for
thinking strategically, as opposed to the strategy and force
structure found in the Dibb Review.
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If an independent commission formulated a national
strategy and force structure, I doubt that the findings of
that commission would be accepted in its entirety as the
Dibb Review was accepted in Australia. In a parliament, the
ruling party controls the government from top to bottom
making it possible to ram through a strategy and expect it
to come out the approving end virtually intact. That could
never happen in the United States. Our Founding Fathers
intentionally divided the government into small pieces to
prevent the ramrodding that occurs in a parliamentary
system. Although critics call this "government by
muddling", the system was designed to be difficult to ensure
that the product was well conceived. Lacking some
galvanizing situation such as a world war, changes in force
structure will occur only in small increments.
Despite all the acknowledged shortcomings of an
independent commission, it is the only reasonable choice.
The findings of such a commission, composed of respected,
pragmatic subject matter experts, would force discussion and
decision. The United States needs to take that first step.
As John Lehman said, "strategy's role is to give coherence
and direction to the process of allocating money among
competing types of ships, and aircraft and different
accounts for spare parts, missile systems, defense planning,
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and training of forces. It provides guidelines to aid us in
allocating both resources and shortages."*4^ That national
strategic direction does not exist. Senator Albert Gore,
Jr. (D-Tenn) said of the latest discussions of the
MX/Midgetman controversy, "In a democracy, consensus itself
is a strategic asset." 41 The United States will never
achieve a consensus while lacking the existence of a new
national strategy. In today's strategic vacuum, an
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